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1. Introduction
Recently, increasing attention has focused on Russian attempts 
at developing their political but also economic influences on other 
countries. The latter mostly refers to trade and investment. Russian 
investments in Hungary, however, have attracted considerable inter-
est on only a few occasions. Possibly the first time this happened 
was at the turn of the century when Gazprom was to acquire major-
ity stakes in two Hungarian (petro)chemical plants, TVK (now Mol 
Petrochemicals) and BorsodChem. At the turn of the 2010s, the 
acquisition of shares in the Hungarian oil and gas company Mol by 
Surgutneftegaz, Russia’s third-largest oil producer, was deserving 
of serious scrutiny. And in the mid-2010s, the project for the con-
struction of two new reactors at the Paks nuclear power plant (the 
Paks-2 project) is worthy of special attention. In the first two cases, 
Russian attempts ultimately proved to be unsuccessful, and thus 
became examples legitimizing fear of Russian capital. Contrary to 
these two, Paks-2 is not a foreign direct investment (FDI) issue; 
however, there are many uncertainties surrounding the project.
In this paper, we measure Russian presence in Hungary in 
terms of foreign direct investment. To achieve a more compre-
hensive view, on the one hand, we look at what the various offi-
cial statistics portray, and, on the other, by using company data 
and case studies, we determine the extent to which the former 
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sources provide an accurate depiction of the real picture. Also, 
we offer an explanation for the current size of Russian FDI in 
Hungary. Finally, we show that a new form of Russian investment 
presence may arise through Paks-2, which will be a much larger 
project than any Russian FDI in Hungary so far or expected in the 
future. Paks-2 is not only a game changer for Hungary’s energy 
policy, but it will have considerable impact on Hungary and Hun-
garian–Russian relations.
2. Russian FDI presence in Hungary according to the official 
statistics
The central banks of Hungary and Russia (MNB and CBR, 
respectively) provide official data on the size of Russian FDI in 
Hungary. The Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) 
offers only minimal support in this respect. However, standard 
FDI statistics are organized on the basis of the immediate host 
and investing country, and not on the ultimate host and investing 
country. This is particularly problematic in the case of Russia, as 
third countries, largely de jure or de facto tax havens and offshore 
centres, play a significant role in intermediating Russian FDI. Nat-
urally, one does not necessarily need to assume suspicious trans-
actions behind all investments through a third country. However, 
ultimately FDI statistics on the immediate host/investing country 
do not provide a complete image of Russian FDI. Notwithstand-
ing, significant changes have been initiated in Hungary recently. 
In September 2016, the MNB started publishing inward FDI posi-
tions according to the country of the ultimate investor.1 The first 
data is for the end of 2014. For other years, there is no existing 
1  FDI statistics on the immediate owners use the 10 per cent threshold of ownership/voting power, 
while FDI statistics on an ultimate investing country basis identify only one ultimate investor as 
the ultimate controlling parent of the resident (i.e. Hungarian) company, and allocate the entire 
stock of foreign direct investment to this one ultimate investor.
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data, making a comparison across years impossible. In addition, 
the MNB is not in an easy position, because in many cases it is 
not easy to credibly identify the ultimate owner.
Taking all this into consideration, it is not surprising that offi-
cial FDI statistics on the basis of the immediate host/investing 
country provided by the MNB and the CBR provide different per-
spectives of the 2010s (see Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendices). 
Similarly, it comes as no surprise that according to the MNB, 
at the end of 2014 Russian FDI stock in Hungary by the ulti-
mate owner was larger (EUR 232.6 million) than that of the data 
measured by the immediate investing country (EUR -12.9 mil-
lion1)2. The latter MNB figure, similarly as throughout the 2010s, 
was negative (see the reasons below). For comparison, the CBR 
shows USD 865 million for end-2014, though this figure has since 
been reduced considerably. For the 2010s, the CBR first exhibited 
a slight rise (at the end of 2013), and then a significant increase 
(at the end of 2014), followed by a sharp drop (in 2016), return-
ing to the level of end-20133. There is, however, no information 
as to what changes these CBR stock data reflect. The flow data 
remained low throughout these years4.
Nevertheless, based on the flow and stock data by the MNB, it is 
clear that the statistics on Russian FDI in Hungary present only a few 
major transactions, including the unsuccessful takeover attempt by 
Surgutneftegaz, and a few changes connected to the Rakhimkulov 
family, namely Megdet Rakhimkulov and his two sons (see below).
1 It is calculated without special-purpose entities.
2  MNB (2016a) Breakdown of inward FDI positions according to the country of the ultimate 
investor. Central Bank of Hungary (MNB). http://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/en-a-kozvetlentoke-
befektetes-allomany-vegso-befektetore-allokallasa-h.pdf
3  CBR (2016a) Russian Federation: Outward foreign direct investment positions by geographical 
allocation in 2009–2016. Central Bank of Russia (CBR). http://cbr.ru/Eng/statistics/credit_
statistics/direct_investment/15e-dir_inv.xlsx
4  CBR (2016b) Russian Federation: Outward foreign direct investments by Russian residents, by 
geographical allocation, 2007–2015, Q1–Q2 2016. http://cbr.ru/Eng/statistics/credit_statistics/
direct_investment/18e-dir_inv.xls
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In terms of Russian FDI inflows into Hungary, there are three 
years, i.e. 2008, 2009 and 2011, with exceptionally high data, 
both negative and positive1 (Being more familiar with what major 
transactions stand behind the MNB data, we rely on official data 
from this Hungarian source in the following). High negative value 
for 2008 is related to a change in the ownership of the Rakhimku-
lovs’ large family business (i.e. only a reorganization of the cor-
porate ownership structure), followed by a divestment. The high 
figures for the years 2009 (positive) and 2011 (negative) reflect 
Surgutneftegaz’s acquisition and sale of shares in Mol. This 21.2 
per cent stake is considered to be the single largest item of Rus-
sian FDI in Hungary. The deal occupied the sixth place among 
the top outward merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions from 
Russia between 2007 and 20092. But due to local resistance to 
the 2009 takeover, Surgutneftegaz sold the stake to the Hun-
garian government in 2011. Even if Surgutneftegaz’s move was 
threatening in many respects, it is no longer of any relevance. The 
MNB data show that aside from these three years, a relatively 
large amount of Russian FDI inflows was received in 20143. This 
was mostly related to “debt instruments”, a component of FDI 
alongside “equity” (including reinvested earnings). Furthermore, 
in this case, transactions are included in the “capital in transit 
and restructuring of asset portfolios”, a category developed by 
1  MNB (2016b) Direct investment flows in Hungary, including SPE’s. https://www.mnb.
hu/letoltes/aifdiflowinclspeeuren.xlsx; MNB (2016c) Direct investment flows in Hungary, 
excluding SPE’s and capital in transit. https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/aifdiflowexclciteuren.xlsx; 
MNB (2016d) Direct investment flows in Hungary, excluding SPE’s. https://www.mnb.hu/
letoltes/aifdiflowexclspeeuren.xlsx
2  Kuznetsov, A., Chetverikova, A., Toganova, N. (2011) Investment from Russia stabilizes after 
the global crisis. EMGP Report, IMEMO — Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International 
Investment, 23 June. http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/10/Russia_2011.pdf
3  MNB (2016b) Direct investment flows in Hungary, including SPE’s. https://www.mnb.
hu/letoltes/aifdiflowinclspeeuren.xlsx; MNB (2016c) Direct investment flows in Hungary, 
excluding SPE’s and capital in transit. https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/aifdiflowexclciteuren.xlsx; 
MNB (2016d) Direct investment flows in Hungary, excluding SPE’s. https://www.mnb.hu/
letoltes/aifdiflowexclspeeuren.xlsx
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the MNB to separate the distortive effects of inflows and outflows 
arriving in and leaving Hungary within a short period.
In terms of Russian FDI stock in Hungary, in addition to the 
high values of end-2009 and end-2010 linked to the Surgutneft-
egaz deal, end-2007 also witnessed a noticeable increase in Rus-
sian FDI stock1. This was only due to a change in the residency 
status of Megdet Rakhimkulov, from Hungarian to Russian, thus 
transforming some of his investments from domestic into Russian 
ones without the conducting of any real transactions.
Except for the above-listed transactions significantly affecting 
Russian FDI flow and/or stock data, in statistical terms Russian 
presence has remained low both from the point of view of Russia 
and that of Hungary since Vladimir Putin came to power more 
than one and a half decades ago. Even in the best years Russian 
FDI in Hungary ever had (at the end of 2009 and 2010), Hunga-
ry’s share in total Russian outward FDI stock did not exceed 0.8 
per cent. At the end of June 2016, it was only 0.06 per cent, put-
ting Hungary in 11th place among the 16 Central and East Euro-
pean (CEE) countries, with only USD 227 million2.3
From the Hungarian point of view, some difficulties arise when 
calculating the share of Russia in the total inward FDI stock held 
by Hungary as except for the two temporary years with Surgutneft-
egaz’s investment, MNB provides negative total Russian FDI stock 
data (“negative net liabilities”). However, if Russian FDI stock data 
are disaggregated into equity and debt instruments, one will see that 
these negative total data are recorded simply because of negative 
debt instrument stocks, i.e. the negative stocks of debt instruments 
1  MNB (2016e) Foreign direct investment position in Hungary, excluding SPE’s. https://www.
mnb.hu/letoltes/aifdistockexclspeeuren.xlsx; MNB (2016f) Foreign direct investment position 
in Hungary, including SPE’s. https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/aifdistockinclspeeuren.xlsx
2  CBR (2016a) Russian Federation: Outward foreign direct investment positions by geographical 
allocation in 2009–2016. Central Bank of Russia (CBR). http://cbr.ru/Eng/statistics/credit_
statistics/direct_investment/15e-dir_inv.xlsx
3  At the end of 2015, it still reached USD 740 million, taking 6th place with a share of 0.2 per 
cent.
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(“negative net liabilities”) are larger than the positive stocks of equity 
(“positive net liabilities”).1 In the case of positive total Russian FDI 
stocks in Hungary, i.e. at the end of 2009 and 2010, Russia’s share 
accounted for only 1.6 and 2.2 per cent of Hungary’s total inward 
FDI stock, respectively (if special-purpose entities are excluded) 
(MNB, 2016e). Measured as a share of GDP, Russia reached a share 
of 1.2 and 1.5 per cent, accordingly, although one of the highest FDI 
flows that Hungary received in 2009 came from Russia.
Assessing the sectoral distribution of Russian FDI stock in 
Hungary is problematic, not only because of the years with a neg-
ative FDI stock, but also because in many cases, the figures are 
made up of data of less than three companies, which should be 
treated as confidential, and thus are not shown on public-use files. 
Therefore, in order to have at least more data with a positive value, 
we should subtract the debt instruments from the total. The results 
confirm our observation that Russian equity FDI in Hungary are 
fairly concentrated (i.e. there are a lot of confidential cells). The 
bulk of them are related to one or two industries and companies. 
And in the remaining industries, “other capital” transactions (debt 
instruments) between members of foreign MNEs dominate.
Eurostat’s Foreign AffiliaTes Statistics (FATS) are compiled 
according to the ultimate controlling institutional unit (UCI) con-
cept.2 Inward FATS data show that in 2013, 3,100 Russian-con-
1  The stocks of debt instruments are negative mainly because of trade-credit claims (more precisely, 
claims are larger than liabilities). These are trade credits among corporate group members 
in a direct investment relationship. Specifically, foreign (i.e. non-Hungarian) multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) have subsidiaries both in Hungary and Russia, and these Hungarian 
subsidiaries trade with the Russian subsidiaries. Most notably, Hungarian subsidiaries supply 
goods and services to the Russian subsidiaries, reflected in the higher stocks of claims (assets) 
than those of the liabilities.
2  This means that the ultimate controlling institutional unit (enterprise, branch or natural person) 
is not controlled by another institutional unit. The words “subsidiary” and “affiliate” can be 
misleading because these Russian-controlled enterprises can be controlled by either natural 
persons or companies. As already emphasized, standard FDI statistics (reported according to 
the immediate owners) use the 10 per cent threshold of ownership/voting power, while FATS 
statistics are based on the country of the ultimate controlling institutional unit, but do not report 
the value of the foreign investment stocks.
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trolled enterprises operated in the EU, compared to 257,000 for-
eign-controlled enterprises1. According to this methodology, 
there were only 134 Russian-controlled enterprises in Hungary. 
The majority of Russian-controlled enterprises were located in 
Central and Eastern Europe, including 767 in Latvia, 624 in Bul-
garia, 495 in Slovenia and 329 in Croatia. These data, natural-
ly, do not include all the companies with Russian involvement. 
The share of Russian-controlled enterprises in the number of for-
eign-controlled enterprises in Hungary was only 0.76 per cent in 
2013, making an almost invisible 0.03 per cent contribution in 
terms of the total number of enterprises in Hungary. The shares 
of Russian affiliates in the total turnover and employment (the 
number of persons employed) of all foreign affiliates in Hungary 
in 2013 were of similarly low proportions, amounting to 0.59 and 
0.23 per cent, respectively. Meanwhile, their weight in the turno-
ver and employment of all enterprises in Hungary were only 0.31 
and 0.06 per cent, accordingly2.
In the case of Hungary, there is no publicly available accurate 
data on the total number of companies with Russian capital. The 
Hungarian company registration database is in place, but various 
important factors — aside from the issue of investments through 
a third country (a problem already discussed above)3 — prevent 
executing automatic searches for companies with Russian own-
ers. Firstly, regarding the ownership held by Russian natural per-
sons, company registries do not require citizenship data (only 
the owners’ permanent address).4 Secondly, joint-stock compa-
1  Eurostat (2016) Foreign control of enterprises by controlling countries (from 2008 onwards) 
(fats_g1b_08). http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=fats_g1b_08&lang=en
2  KSH (n.a.) Activity of foreign affiliates (FATS). Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH). 
http://statinfo.ksh.hu/Statinfo/themeSelector.jsp?page=2&szst=QTD&lang=en
3  One does not necessarily need to think of a third-country company as a special-purpose entity 
(including/or a holding company). It has happened, for example, that a foreign manufacturing 
company with a Hungarian subsidiary was taken over by Russian owners.
4  It is important to note, however, that FDI statistics are based on the person’s country of residence 
rather than his/her country of citizenship.
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nies, which are typically larger companies in Hungary, are also 
not required to disclose their ownership structure. Thirdly, mul-
ti-layered investments may hide the nationality of the ultimate 
owners.1 Therefore, any numbers for Russian-interest companies 
(both with direct or indirect Russian ownership) are approximate. 
Citing unnamed Russian sources — but essentially just reiterat-
ing information that had already been circulated by its predeces-
sor, ITD Hungary –, the Hungarian Investment and Trade Agency 
(HITA) claimed that over 2,000 joint ventures with Russian own-
ership were operating in Hungary.2 The Russian trade representa-
tion in Hungary also has information about some 2,000 compa-
nies with Russian shareholders, mainly small and medium-sized 
enterprises3. Nonetheless, we suppose that both estimates are 
based on the Hungarian company registration database.
Due to various methodological and other reasons, there are 
several important (or more or less important) Russian investments 
which — either on the basis of the immediate investing country or 
on an ultimate investing country basis — have certainly not been 
recorded as Russian FDI by the MNB. Thus, in order to evaluate 
the whole picture, one also needs to assess company data.
3. Russian presence as observed via company data/case 
studies
3.1. The case of the Rakhimkulovs
For almost 20 years after 1989, Russian corporate presence in 
Hungary was facilitated through Megdet Rakhimkulov’s activ-
ities. He played a significant role in Hungary — both as a top 
1  A simple case is that of a company in Hungary that is set up or acquired by a Hungarian-
registered company with a Russian background.
2  HITA’s legal successor is the Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency (HIPA) established in 
2014.
3  Hvg.hu (2012) Egyre dinamikusabb a magyar–orosz kereskedelem. 9 March. http://hvg.hu/
gazdasag/20120309_magyar_orosz_kereskedelem
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Russian investor on his own account and as an intermediary for 
other investors. He was listed as Hungary’s richest businessman 
in 2005. Rakhimkulov established his fortune in the first half of 
the 1990s as a senior manager at Gazprom and its Hungarian 
representative. In those years, Budapest was by far Gazprom’s 
biggest export destination in the CEE region and the company’s 
management tried to maintain some of its revenues in Hungary. 
Not surprisingly, Gazprombank (at that time, Gazprom’s subsid-
iary) purchased a Hungarian bank, General Banking and Trust 
(ÁÉB), as early as in 1996. Later, the bank was gradually tak-
en over by the Rakhimkulov family’s companies. Rakhimkulov 
allegedly played an important role in the attempts of Vyakhirev’s 
management to outsource Gazprom’s assets into private proper-
ty in the late 1990s. Rakhimkulov was involved in facilitating 
the purchase of stakes in TVK and BorsodChem.1 Rakhimkulov 
was also associated with Surgutneftegaz’s 2009 attempt at the 
hostile takeover of Mol. Despite the end of Rakhimkulov’s influ-
ence in Gazprom following the arrival of Alexey Miller, the Rus-
sian businessman preserved control over his affiliated Hungarian 
assets such as ÁÉB. Thus, Rakhimkulov became an independent 
actor with a broad nexus within the Hungarian elite and consider-
able financial and institutional capabilities. In spite of his contro-
versial track record, many Russian businessmen and politicians 
allegedly trusted him in their dealings with Hungary. Hence, it 
has often been difficult to decide whether he made his investment 
decisions independently or whether they were indirectly linked to 
third-party Russian interests. He was also an intermediary, and, 
in some alleged cases, a shadow owner who could accumulate 
ownership in companies without being noticed and would then 
later resell it to the real Russian owners. His influence reached its 
zenith in the mid-2000s. Over the next years, he gradually retired 
1 Since 2003, Gazprom has not held any stakes in either company.
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and formally moved back to Moscow. His two sons took over 
much of the family’s business activities in Hungary and Cyprus. 
In the 2000s, the Rakhimkulov family rationalized its portfolio, 
decreasing their shares of some sectoral assets. All the chemical 
and machine-industry plants and even ÁÉB were sold to various 
Austrian companies in the mid-2000s. Today, the Rakhimkulov 
family primarily seems to be a financial investor. The 8.5 per cent 
stake (with a voting power of 8.6 per cent) of the Rakhimkulov 
family in Hungary’s leading retail bank, OTP Bank, considered a 
portfolio investment and estimated at 0.5 per cent of Hungary’s 
GDP, constitutes by far the biggest item on the list of Russian 
investments in Hungary. According to the participants’ narrative, 
their share is only a financial asset without any relevance for the 
decision-making process1.
3.2. Investment in gas and oil 
Gazprom’s main ownership interest in Hungary is Panrusgáz, 
an intermediary joint venture for Russian gas imports via Hun-
gary’s major long-term gas supply contract. Currently, Gazprom 
Export, Gazprom’s export arm, has two long-term gas supply 
contracts with Hungary, including their major one with Hungari-
an Gas Trade through Panrusgáz, and a small contract with Cen-
trex Hungary, an affiliate of the Gazprombank-owned and Vien-
na-based Centrex Europe Energy & Gas AG.2 Panrusgáz sells all 
the gas it imports to Hungarian Gas Trade. The original motiva-
tion behind this complicated scheme was likely Gazprom’s desire 
to keep the gas sale revenues abroad, outside Russia (see above). 
1   Weiner, Cs. (2015) Tracking Russian FDI in Hungary. In Deák, A. (ed.): The End of an Era in 
Eurasia? Conflict in Eastern Ukraine and Economic Downturn in the Post-Soviet Space. East 
European Studies, No. 6. Institute of World Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional 
Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, pp. 120–168; Deák, A., Weiner, Cs. (2016) 
Country Report: Hungary. Unpublished manuscript prepared for the project “Russian economic 
influence in new Europe”, Center for the Study of Democracy (Sofia) and Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (Washington D.C.).
2  Gazprom has not had control over Gazprombank for many years.
203
But whatever rationale was behind the intermediary, today it hard-
ly seems to be reasonable. It does not pursue any practical activi-
ties except for transferring wholesale gas with relatively low mar-
gins. Panrusgáz established a small office in Hungary, which also 
functions as Gazprom’s local office.
Among the Hungarian gas traders, three have Russian owners. 
Gazprom has stakes in two of these three. One is the above-men-
tioned Centrex Hungary, and the other company is the Russo–
German WIEE Hungary. However, the third trader, MET Hunga-
ry, is much more important for this discussion. MET Hungary and 
the Swiss-based MET Holding are the most obscure companies in 
the current Hungarian gas landscape, especially due to their high 
political entrenchment. MET’s story is directly linked to cheap-
er gas imports from the West. In 2011, the Hungarian legislation 
established a favourable environment, primarily taken advantage 
of by MET Hungary, to reap huge profits from gas trading activi-
ties in Hungary. Originally, MET Hungary was set up by Mol, and 
became half-owned by the Belize-based Normeston in late 2009. 
The only released information stated that Normeston had been 
owned by a Russian national that year. In 2012, Normeston’s 
stake was sold to a company registered in the Cayman Islands. 
Since then, perhaps due to the domestic scandals, the ownership 
structure has been made public. The present Russian owner of 
MET Group is Ilya Trubnikov, a Russian–Canadian citizen, with 
a 12.7 per cent stake. But the beneficiaries of the high profitability 
years remain only partially clarified.
Gazprom’s other plans and projects in Hungary include fail-
ures. After those involving the BorsodChem and TVK transac-
tions, Gazprom did not obtain any interest in Mol’s gas business, 
and neither underground gas storage facilities nor gas pipelines 
have been built.1 After the cancellation of South Stream, Hunga-
1   However, there were pipeline plans already in the 1990s. Also, already in the 1990s, Gazprom 
had been present, albeit indirectly, in Hungary’s regional gas distribution.
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ry elaborated the Tesla gas pipeline (from Turkey across Greece, 
Macedonia, Serbia, Hungary, ending in Austria), supposedly not 
independently of behind-the-scene Russian suggestions. Appar-
ently, Budapest would like to remain a policy shaper in this issue. 
In addition, the Hungarian government is keen to bring gas tran-
sit to Hungary and fears being left out if any pipelines are built. 
But the Russian pipeline projects remain attractive predominant-
ly as a bargaining chip in Hungary’s gas supply talks. Further, 
Hungary hopes for better utilization of its idle storage capacities. 
But even if Hungarian pipeline politics is often characterized as 
Russia-friendly, this assessment is not fully justified. As a result 
of so many disappointing projects, enthusiasm for Russian-led 
pipelines remains rather low in Budapest. Most domestic stake-
holders approach any prospective projects with care and caution. 
Pipeline projects, including non-Russian ones, have lost much of 
their credibility. But Hungary keeps the Russian connection alive 
because Moscow is still considered a major policymaker in pipe-
line projects1.
Investment in Hungary’s oil industry has also included plenty 
of failed efforts, including those of Yukos, Surgutneftegaz, Lukoil 
and Gazprom Neft2.3
3.3. Corporate presence in other sectors
Apart from Russia’s presence in the energy sector, there are 
only a limited number of important assets in Russian ownership. 
Hungary’s non-energy/utility and non-telecom infrastructure-re-
1  Deák, A., Weiner, Cs. (2016) Country Report: Hungary. Unpublished manuscript prepared for 
the project “Russian economic influence in new Europe”, Center for the Study of Democracy 
(Sofia) and Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington D.C.).
2  Weiner, Cs. (2015) Tracking Russian FDI in Hungary. In Deák, A. (ed.): The End of an Era in 
Eurasia? Conflict in Eastern Ukraine and Economic Downturn in the Post-Soviet Space. East 
European Studies, No. 6. Institute of World Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional 
Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, pp. 120–168.
3  Yet, Gazprom Neft, Gazprom’s oil arm and Russia’s fourth-largest crude producer, is still active 
in Hungary via Serbia’s NIS oil company, the majority of which is owned by Gazprom Neft.
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lated industries have also been at the forefront of Russian inves-
tors’ interest, though on the whole their investment efforts have 
not been successful thus far.1 In Hungary, there have only been 
two Russian-owned banks, including, in the past, ÁÉB, and, now, 
a subsidiary of Sberbank. Additionally, there is a strong indirect 
Russian presence in Hungarian metallurgy, and there have also 
been a few Russian capital-related projects in Hungary’s machin-
ery worth mentioning.
One large Russian (and also Ukrainian) industrial investment 
in Hungary is the ISD Dunaferr steel plant. By the end of the 
1990s, Hungarian metallurgy was struggling, due to their low 
scale of economy, lack of capital and inefficient management. 
In light of approaching EU accession, privatization was the only 
feasible way to save the factory. The government had neither the 
money nor the legal possibilities to subsidize it further. For exter-
nal producers, especially those from the former Soviet Union, 
these capacities offered a means of bypassing EU protectionism 
of the steel market. But due to the changes in world steel market 
dynamics, these synergies have since lost much of their relevance, 
once again reemphasizing the strategic weaknesses of these fac-
tories. At the end of 2003, Dunaferr was tendered and bought by 
a consortium, consisting of Ukraine’s Industrial Union of Don-
bass (ISD) and the Swiss Duferco International Trading Hold-
ing Ltd. The Russian Severstal also submitted a bid. Nonethe-
less, ISD gradually lost the power struggle in the Ukrainian steel 
industry and its owners were forced to sell their controlling stake 
of 50 per cent plus two shares in the metallurgical assets of ISD to 
Russian investors2. Now, as a creditor, Russia’s state-owned Vne-
sheconombank (VEB) practically controls ISD. In 2016, there 
1  Among others, these have included a project to set up and operate an international warehouse 
and logistics centre in Záhony in Eastern Hungary; the plans suggested by Magnit, Russia’s 
largest grocery retailer by revenue and number of stores, to build a logistics centre and a 
transport department near Záhony; and the Russian involvement in Malév Hungarian Airlines.
2 Deák, A., Weiner, Cs. (2016) Country Report: Hungary. 
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were reports in the media that VEB was actively seeking a buy-
er for ISD 1. In early 2017, media sources suggested that Duna-
ferr might get a new Russian owner2. The European steel industry 
and in particular Dunaferr have been struggling since the 2008–
2009 crisis. In 2013, a cost optimisation program was announced. 
Reacting to this news, the Hungarian government offered to buy 
ISD Dunaferr, but the proposal was refused. Consequently, the 
fate of the company has become a sensitive political issue.
Much of the Hungarian machine-building capacity was lost 
during the transition. Nevertheless, in some cases, past relations 
with Russian partners could save some capacities, and there are 
also some examples of newly established, greenfield plants and 
cooperations.3 In light of the Paks-2 project, the most relevant is 
the joint venture called Ganz Engineering and Energetics Machin-
ery, between Ganz Machinery Works Holding and its Russian 
state-owned partner. Ganz Engineering and Energetics Machin-
ery is involved, among others, in the manufacture and installation 
of hydromachines, nuclear power station machinery and oil drill-
ing equipment4.
1  Kommersant (2016) VEB rasstayetsya s samym dorogim. 6 May. http://www.kommersant.ru/
doc/2980313
2  Világgazdaság (2017) Dunaferr: Orosz milliárdos a képben. 24 January. http://www.vg.hu/
vallalatok/dunaferr-orosz-milliardos-a-kepben-481414
3  Two agricultural machinery factories in Hungary were owned by a Russian group (Concern 
Tractor Plants/Agromash Holding B.V.) via Austria’s Vogel & Noot. Concern Tractor Plants/
Agromash Holding B.V. took over Vogel & Noot in 2009, but the latter went bankrupt. Since 
the autumn of 2016, both Hungarian subsidiaries have had German owners.
4  Weiner, Cs. (2015) Tracking Russian FDI in Hungary. In Deák, A. (ed.): The End of an Era in 
Eurasia? Conflict in Eastern Ukraine and Economic Downturn in the Post-Soviet Space. East 
European Studies, No. 6. Institute of World Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional 
Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, pp. 120–168; Deák, A., Weiner, Cs. (2016) 
Country Report: Hungary. Unpublished manuscript prepared for the project “Russian economic 
influence in new Europe”, Center for the Study of Democracy (Sofia) and Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (Washington D.C.).
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4. The Paks-2 project
In January 2014, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán concluded a 
huge nuclear deal with Russia so that Russia’s State Atomic Ener-
gy Corporation Rosatom could participate in the design and con-
struction of the future fifth and sixth blocks of the Paks nuclear 
power plant. The new nuclear blocs will be owned by Hungary 
and are planned to cost around EUR 12.5 billion, accounting for 
more than 12 per cent of the Hungarian GDP. The Russian budget 
will also provide a EUR 10-billion credit line for the project, and 
VEB will act as an agent for the Russian government.1 The two 
new units are expected to be commissioned in the middle of the 
2020s, with a slightly higher combined capacity than that of the 
four old blocs. Concurrently, the four old blocs shall be phased 
out in the 2030s. Undoubtedly, the replacement of the existing 
nuclear reactors has been a major policy challenge, but the politi-
cal motivations behind the sudden decision to implement a major 
nuclear construction project remain unclear. One of the funda-
mental shortcomings of Paks-2 is that, even on the policy level, 
plans for any alternative solutions have been ruled out. Russia’s 
offer had a single major financial advantage, namely the size-
able loan and its conditions. Without the loan, Budapest likely 
would not have opted for Paks-2, due to its high short- and medi-
um-term political and budgetary costs. The deal was negotiated in 
total secrecy, without proper policy and political preparation and 
1  Five documents have been signed regarding Paks-2. The first, signed on 14 January 2014, 
establishing the legal basis for Paks-2, is the Hungarian–Russian intergovernmental agreement 
on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This was followed by the financial 
intergovernmental agreement (on the intergovernmental loan to be provided to Hungary for 
financing the construction of the project) concluded on 28 March 2014. On 9 December 2014, 
Hungary’s MVM Paks II Nuclear Power Plant Development and Rosatom’s NIAEP signed 
(1) the engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contract, (2) the operation and 
maintenance (O&M) contract and (3) the fuel supply contract. Officially, these three documents 
are called implementation agreements. The only two documents publicly available are the 
intergovernmental agreement and the loan agreement.
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without the involvement of state administration. Prime Minister 
Viktor Orbán was personally involved in the discussions, taking 
much of the accompanied political risks. Thus, it is not surprising 
that the contractual regime has serious deficiencies. If we ignore 
nuclear security and technology aspects, two major types of issues 
may derail the Paks-2 project: regulatory and management defi-
cits. The regulatory deficit is related to the EU regulatory level, 
and includes technological, energy security, public procurement, 
financial and competition aspects. The critical management risks 
for a nuclear power investment and those who bear responsibili-
ty are unknown. The major questions here are who will bear the 
responsibility if the construction is halted or delayed and how 
will the penalties to be paid by Russia relate to the due interests 
of the loan instalments, already provided to Hungary. The article 
in the loan agreement on dispute settlement is just as vague, as it 
does not incorporate a mechanism for international arbitration. 
This is complicated by another article in the loan agreement, stat-
ing that if the Hungarian party is in financial arrears for over 180 
days, then Moscow is entitled to ask for an immediate repayment 
of the total unpaid debt in a lump sum. As the Hungarian side 
would obviously be unable to fulfil this condition, the Russian 
party would, therefore, always have the upper hand in any dis-
pute resolution procedures. Understandably, there are many other 
problems which may arise in the next couple of years1.
5. Summary and conclusions: explaining the low Russian 
FDI presence
Statistics offer limited help in establishing a real picture of 
Russian FDI in Hungary. In many cases, indirect FDI have been 
observed. Consequently, the size and variety of Russian presence 
1 Deák, A., Weiner, Cs. (2016) Country Report: Hungary. 
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can only be estimated by analysing company and media sources 
in meticulous detail. But although the presence of Russian inves-
tors in Hungary is more significant than official statistics indicate, 
the overall picture is not much altered. Not only do the official 
statistics say that Russian FDI plays a limited role in Hungary but 
company data suggest the same. Our research shows that among 
the top 20 non-financial Russian MNEs, only a few companies 
are active investors in Hungary. Due to the inflow of large-scale 
Western FDI, Russian FDI has remained minuscule within the 
total inward FDI stock in Hungary. Russia’s visible or alleged 
presence also remains relatively humble if compared with some 
CEE countries. As it was limited to the end of both 2009 and 
2010, Hungary’s leading position − in statistical terms − in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe in terms of attracting Russian FDI proved 
to be temporary, and was only due to the Surgutneftegaz deal.
The reasons for the low Russian FDI activity are manifold. 
Hungary had a relatively swift economic transformation and an 
extensive privatization process, including in some major seg-
ments of the energy sector in the 1990s. Key positions in the 
national economy had already been occupied by private compa-
nies by the late 1990s when, with a couple of exceptions,1 the first 
Russian actors capable of investing abroad consolidated them-
selves. By the late 1990s, Hungary had almost fully privatized 
its economy. In the energy sector, the emergence of a domestic 
private company, Mol, played a crucial role in fighting back Rus-
sian investment efforts. In turn, Prime Minister Orbán’s recent 
drive for renationalization partly explains his limited openness 
to new Russian FDI. The Hungarian government has recently 
bought back a high number of energy assets from Western inves-
tors, and it would like to keep these for the long term. In certain 
cases, EU regulatory issues also work in ways that run counter 
1  Until 2000, Gazprom and Lukoil accounted for around 90 per cent of Russia’s assets abroad 
(RUSAL–EIU, 2006, p. 17).
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to Russian FDI expectations. For example, the EU’s Third Ener-
gy Package for an internal gas and electricity market in the EU 
limits Russia’s abilities. Furthermore, the Russian capabilities for 
new investments have been diminished by the 2008–2009 finan-
cial crisis and, more recently, by low oil prices and Western sanc-
tions against Russia over its actions in Ukraine. Consequently, 
FDI may now even constitute a less accentuated part of Russian 
influence in CEE than prior to 2008. In recent years, the invest-
ment climate in Hungary has also been unfavourable. It is clear 
that the controversial “crisis tax” has negatively affected Russian 
players. The so-called “Robin Hood” tax is a burden on energy 
firms, while a tax on public utility pipelines and cables has also 
been introduced. Furthermore, cultural gaps, the non-Slavic lan-
guage and the lack of a sizeable Russian diaspora have limited the 
Russian outreach for many individuals and smaller companies1.
Company data and our case studies demonstrate that the activ-
ities of Russian investors in Hungary analysed here have been 
paved with failures. These have been evident in both divestments 
and unrealised plans. Kalotay et al.2 suggest that the low share of 
Russian investment in the Visegrád countries may be referred to 
as business opportunities that the Russian parties failed to exploit. 
Our case studies confirm this assumption in the case of Hungary.
As for future Russian investments, FDI projects similar in 
scope to the Surgutneftegaz deal are not likely in Hungary in the 
near future. Instead, Hungary might have Paks-2, with an inter-
1  Weiner, Cs. (2015) Tracking Russian FDI in Hungary. In Deák, A. (ed.): The End of an Era in 
Eurasia? Conflict in Eastern Ukraine and Economic Downturn in the Post-Soviet Space. East 
European Studies, No. 6. Institute of World Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional 
Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, pp. 120–168; Deák, A., Weiner, Cs. (2016) 
Country Report: Hungary. Unpublished manuscript prepared for the project “Russian economic 
influence in new Europe”, Center for the Study of Democracy (Sofia) and Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (Washington D.C.).
2  Kalotay, K., Éltető, A., Sass, M., Weiner, Cs. (2014) Russian capital in the Visegrád countries. 
Working Papers, No. 210. Institute of World Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional 
Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, December. 
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governmental loan to be recorded as “other investment” in the 
financial account of the balance of payments. The Paks-2 deals 
represent an unexpected turn regarding Hungary’s energy depend-
ence. The deals will increase Hungary’s reliance both on Rus-
sian nuclear technology and financial support, and raises many 
questions related to the future of Hungarian–Russian political and 
economic relations.
Чаба Вейнер
ЕЩЕ РАЗ ОБ ЭНЕРГЕТИКЕ: НОВЫЕ ФОРМЫ РОССИЙСКОГО 
ИНВЕСТИЦИОННОГО ПРИСУТСТВИЯ В ВЕНГРИИ
В Центральной и Восточной Европе всегда уделялось особое вни-
мание политическому и экономическому влиянию России. Последнее 
относится главным образом к торговле и инвестициям. В данной статье 
автор измеряет присутствие российского капитала в Венгрии через пря-
мые иностранные инвестиции (ПИИ). Отмечается, что российские ПИИ 
в Венгрии играют ограниченную роль, хотя в реальности они больше, 
чем указывает официальная статистика. Автор довольно скептически 
относится к росту российских ППИ в Венгрии в будущем, но при этом 
указывает на новый канал присутствия российского капитала: крупный 
кредит, который будет предоставлен российской стороной на реализацию 
проекта по строительству новых блоков венгерской АЭС «Пакш». Этот 
проект представляет собой непредсказуемый поворот в деле энергетиче-
ской зависимости Венгрии. Соглашение усилит зависимость Венгрии от 
России как в сфере атомных технологий, так и в области финансовой под-
держки. В этой связи возникает много вопросов, касающихся будущего 
венгеро–российских политических и экономических отношений.
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